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ON RANDOM STABLE MATCHINGS: CYCLIC
MATCHINGS WITH STRICT PREFERENCES AND
TWO-SIDE MATCHINGS WITH PARTIALLY ORDERED
PREFERENCES.
BORIS PITTEL
Abstract. Consider a cyclically ordered collection of r equi-numerous
agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from
the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the
set of agents into disjoint union of r-long cycles, one agent from each set
per cycle, such that there are no destabilizing r-long cycles, i.e. cycles
in which every agent strictly prefers its successor to its successor in the
matching. Assuming that the preferences are uniformly random and in-
dependent, we show that the expected number of stable matchings grows
with n (cardinality of each agent set) as (n log n)r−1. We also consider
a bipartite stable matching problem where preference list of each agent
forms a partially ordered set. Each partial order is an intersection of
several, ki for side i, independent, uniformly random, strict orders. For
k1 + k2 > 2, the expected number of stable matchings is analyzed for
three, progressively stronger, notions of stability. The expected number
of weakly stable matchings is shown to grow super-exponentially fast. In
contrast, for min(k1, k2) > 1, the fraction of instances with at least one
strongly stable (super-stable) matching is super-exponentially small.
1. Introduction and main results
Consider the set of n men and n women facing a problem of selecting a
marriage partner. A marriage M is a matching (bijection) between the two
sets. It is assumed that each man and each woman ranks all the members
as a potential marriage partner, with no ties allowed. A marriage is called
stable if there is no unmarried pair–a man and a woman–who prefer each
other to their respective partners in the marriage. A classic theorem, due
to Gale and Shapley [6], asserts that, given any system of preferences, there
exists at least one stable marriage M .
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The proof of this theorem is algorithmic. A bijection is constructed in
steps such that at each step every man not currently on hold makes a pro-
posal to his best choice among women who haven’t rejected him before, and
the chosen woman either provisionally puts the man on hold or rejects him,
based on comparison of him to her current suitor if she has one already.
Since a woman who once gets proposed to always has a man on hold after-
wards, after finally many steps every woman has a suitor, and the resulting
bijection turns out to be stable. Of course the roles can be reversed, with
women proposing and each man selecting between the current proponent
and a woman whose proposal he currently holds, if there is such a woman.
In general, the two resulting matchings, M1 and M2 are different, one man-
optimal, another woman-optimal.
The interested reader is encouraged to consult Gusfield and Irving [9] for a
rich, detailed analysis of the algebraic (lattice) structure of stable matchings
set, and Manlove [15] for encyclopedic presentation of a growing body of a
contemporary research on a diverse variety of matching problems.
A decade after the Gale-Shapley paper, McVitie and Wilson [16] devel-
oped an alternative, sequential, algorithm in which proposals by one side to
another are made one at a time. This procedure delivers the same matching
as the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This purely combinatorial, numbers-free,
description begs for a probabilistic analysis of the problem chosen uniformly
at random among all the instances, whose total number is (n!)2n. In a pio-
neering paper [24] Wilson reduced the work of the sequential algorithm to a
classic urn scheme (coupon-collector problem) and proved that the expected
running time, whence the expected total rank of wives in the man-optimal
matching, is at most nHn ∼ n log n, Hn =
∑n
j=1 1/j.
A few years later, Knuth [11], among other results, found a better up-
per bound (n − 1)Hn + 1, and established a matching lower bound nHn −
O(log4 n). He also posed a series of open problems, one of them on the
expected number of the stable matchings. Knuth pointed out that an an-
swer might be found via his formula for the probability P (n) that a generic
matching M is stable:
(1.1) P (n) =
2n︷ ︸︸ ︷∫
· · ·
∫
x,y∈[0,1]n
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
(1− xiyj) dxdy.
(His proof relied on an inclusion-exclusion formula, and an interpretation of
each summand as the value of a 2n-dimensional integral, with the integrand
equal to the corresponding summand in the expansion of the integrand in
(1.1).) The expected value of S(n), the total number of stable matchings,
would then be determined from E[S(n)] = n!P (n).
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Following Don Knuth’s suggestion, in [18] we used the equation (1.1) to
obtain an asymptotic formula
(1.2) P (n) = (1 + o(1))
e−1n log n
n!
=⇒ E[S(n)] ∼ e−1n log n.
More generally, in [19] we derived a formula for Pk,ℓ(n), the probability that
the generic matching M is stable and QM = k, RM = ℓ; here QM (RM ,
resp.) is the total rank of wives as ranked by their husbands (the total rank
of husbands as ranked by their wives, resp.) in M .
The key element of the proofs of the integral representations for these
probabilities, which also imply the Knuth formula (1.1), was a refined prob-
ability space. Its sample point is a pair of two n × n matrices X = {Xi,j},
Y = {Yi,j} with all 2n2 entries being independent, [0, 1]-uniform random
variables. Reading each row of X and each column of Y in increasing order
we recover the independent, uniform preferences of each of nmen and of each
of n women respectively. And, for instance, the integrand in (1.1) turns out
equal to the probability that a generic matching M is stable, conditioned on
the values xi = Xi,M(i), yj = YM−1(j),j
Using the formula for Pk,ℓ(n), we proved a law of hyperbola: asymptoti-
cally almost surely (a.a.s.) maxM |n−3QMRM−1| ≤ n−1/4+o(1). It followed,
in particular, that a.a.s. S(n) ≥ n1/2−o(1), a significant improvement of the
logarithmic bound in Knuth, Motwani and Pittel [12]. Thus, for a large
number of participants, a typical instance of the preferences has multiple
stable matchings, very nearly obeying the preservation law for the product
of the total man-rank and the total woman-rank. In a way this law is not un-
like thermodynamic laws in physics of gases. However those laws are usually
of phenomenological nature, while the product law is a rigorous corollary of
the local stability conditions for the random instance of the preferences.
Later Lennon and Pittel [14] extended the techniques in [18], [19] to show
that E[S(n)2] ∼ (e−2 + 0.5e−3)(n log n)2. Combined with (1.2), this result
implied that S(n) is of order n log n with probability 0.84, at least. Jointly
with Shepp and Veklerov [20] we proved that, for a fixed k, the expected
number of women with k stable husbands is asymptotic to (log n)k+1/ (k −
1)!. In a recent ground-breaking paper Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno [1]
analyzed a random stable matching problem with unequal sizes n1 and n2
of the two sides. They discovered that the set of properly scaled total ranks
{(QM , RM )}M a.a.s. converges to a single point even if |n2 − n1| = 1. We
showed [21] that if n2 ≫ n2 − n1 > 0 then the expected number of stable
matchings is asymptotic to e−1n1/[(n2−n1) log n1], compared to e−1n1 log n1
for n2 = n1, [18].
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Among other avenues of research, Knuth [11] was interested in whether the
stable matching problem can be fruitfully generalized to, say, three equinu-
merous sets of agents, referred to as men, women and dogs. The goal is to
partition the sets of agents into triples, (a man, a woman, a dog), such that
[given the agents preferences] the set of triples is stable in some sense.
As reported in Ng and Hirschberg [17], Knuth was particularly interested
in the case of cyclic preferences over individual agents: each of nmen ranks n
women, and women only; each of n women ranks n dogs, and dogs only; each
of n dogs ranks n men, and men only. We will use the notation “w1
m≺ w2” to
indicate that a man m prefers woman w1 to w2, and will indicate similarly
the preferences of men and dogs.
Denoting the three sets M, W and D, a matching M is a partition of
M∪W ∪ D into n ordered triples (m,w, d), each triple being viewed as a
directed 3-cycle m → w → d → m. So M is a permutation of M∪W ∪D
with cycles of length 3, each cycle of the same type m → w → d → m.
For each agent a, let M(a) denote the successor of a in the cycle of M
that contains a. A directed t = (m → w → d → m) strongly blocks M if
w
m≺M(m), d w≺M(w), m d≺M(d). A matching M is called weakly stable if
no cycle t = (m→ w → d→ m) strongly blocks M . Eriksson et al. [4] and
Escamocher and O’Sullivan [5] conjectured that a weakly stable matching
exists for every instance of cyclic preferences. Recently Lam and Paxton [13]
found an instance of cyclic preferences that has no weakly stable matching.
Similarly, assuming strict preferences, t = (m → w → d → m) weakly
blocks M if at least two agents a1 and a2 from t prefer their successors in t
to their successors in M , and the successor of a3 in t is M(a3). M is called
strongly stable if no t weakly blocks M .
In this paper we consider the stable matchings under cyclic preferences
with r ≥ 3 sides. Here we have an ordered sequence of r equinumerous agent
sets A1, . . . ,Ar; each a ∈ As ranks all agents a′ ∈ As+1, (Ar+1 := A1). A
matching M is a partition of A1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ar into disjoint directed cycles
a1 → · · · → ar → a1, (as ∈ As).
M is called weakly stable (w-stable) if there is no tuple a1, . . . , ar of agents
from the sets A1, . . . , Ar such that
a2
a1≺M(a1), a3
a2≺M(a2), · · · , a1
ar≺M(ar),
where M(a) is the successor of a in the cycle from the matching M that
contains a.
Given m ≥ ⌈r/2⌉ (the least integer strictly exceeding r/2), we say that a
cyclic tuple of agents a1 → · · · → ar → a1 weakly blocks M if at least m
STABLE MATCHINGS 5
agents ai (strictly) prefer their successors in the tuple to their successors in
M . We call M strongly stable if no cyclic tuple weakly blocks M .
We will prove
Theorem 1.1. Let Sn,r denote the total number of weakly stable matchings.
For r ≥ 3, we have
E[Sn,r] & (cr + o(1))
(
n log n
2
)r−1
, cr := P(Tr−1 ∈ [1, 2]),
where Tr−1 =
∑
j∈[r−1] Yj , and Yj are independent [0, 1]-uniform random
variables.
Note. (1) Notice that cr > 0 for r ≥ 3, but, formally, c2 = 0. As we
mentioned, we had proved that E[Sn,2] ∼ e−1n log n, [18], and also that
w.h.p. Sn,2 ≥ n1/2−o(1). Theorem 2.2 emboldens us to conjecture that, for
r > 2, w.h.p. Sn,r ≥ nγr , where γr → ∞ as r grows. (2) We worked out a
lower bound for the expected number of strongly stable matchings as well:
the bound fast goes to zero as n → ∞. We conjecture that the fraction of
instances with at least one strongly stable matching is vanishing as n→∞.
Gusfield and Irving [9] and Irving [10] introduced and studied a more
general stable marriage problem, with two sides of size n each, when the
preference lists are partially ordered, i.e. tied entries in the lists are allowed.
They defined three, progressively weaker, notions of a stable matching. (1)
A matching M is super-stable if there is no unmatched (man, woman) pair
such that the man and the woman like each other at least as much as his/her
partner in M . (2) M is strongly stable if there is no unmatched (man,
woman) pair such that (a) either the man strictly prefers the woman to
his partner in M or the woman and his partner are tied in his list and
(b) either the woman strictly prefers the man to her partner in M or the
man and her partner in M are tied in her list. (3) M is weakly stable if
there is no unmatched (man, woman) pair such that they strictly prefer each
other to their partners underM . It was demonstrated in [9] that a properly
extended Gale-Shapley algorithm allows to determine the existence of a
super-stable or strongly stable matching for any given instance of partially
ordered preferences. As for weak stability, a stable matching can be found by,
first, extending each of the partial orders to a linear order, which can always
be done, and in multiple ways, and, second, applying the Gale-Shapley
algorithm.
The ground-breaking work in [9] and [10] stimulated an impressive re-
search on stable matchings with partial information about the preference
lists, see for instance Rastagari et al. [22], Rastagari et al. [23], and Gelain
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et al. [7]. What the author learned about the contemporary state of re-
search in stable matchings under preferences came from reading the book
by Manlove [15], a remarkably systematic, thought-provoking, expert survey
of highly diverse models and algorithms of stable matchings.
It occurred to us that as a natural, more general, version of the sequence of
n independent [0, 1]-Uniforms, inducing the uniform linearly ordered prefer-
ence list, one can consider the sequence of n independent [0, 1]k-Uniforms, i.e.
a sequence of n points {Z(j)}j∈[n] chosen uniformly, and independently, from
the k-cube [0, 1]k. Intersecting the k coordinate linear orders on {Z(j)}j∈[n]
we obtain Pk(n), a partial order on those n points, with order dimension
k at most. As Brightwell indicated in his authoritative survey [2], the ran-
dom k-dimensional partial orders have been a subject of systematic studies
since a 1985 paper of Winkler [25], see also Winkler [26], and “had in fact
occurred in various different guises earlier”.
So in this paper we consider the case when the partially ordered prefer-
ences of n men (women resp.) over women (men resp.) are n independent
copies of the random partial order Pk1(n) (Pk2(n) resp.). Equivalently, we
have the n sequences {X(j)i }j∈[n], (i ∈ [n]), and the n sequences {Y(i)j }i∈[n],
(j ∈ [n]), with all X(j)i and Y(i)j being independent, [0, 1]k1 -Uniforms and
[0, 1]k2 -Uniforms respectively, so that, for instance, the partial order induced
by {X(j)i }j∈[n] is the partially ordered preference list of man i over the set
of women j ∈ [n].
Let Sn,w, Sn,s and Sn,sup stand for the random number of weakly, strongly
and super-stable matchings respectively. Obviously Sn,w ≥ Sn,s ≥ Sn,sup.
Also Sn,w (Sn,sup resp.) is stochastically monotone increasing (decreasing
resp.) with respect to (k1, k2). We will prove two claims.
Theorem 1.2. Let k := max(k1, k2) > 1. Then
(log n)(k−1−o(1))n ≤ E[Sn,w] ≤ (log n)(k1+k2−1+o(1))n.
Theorem 1.3. (i) If k := min(k1, k2) > 2, then
E[Sn,s] ≤ n−n
(
k−1
k+1
−o(1)
)
, E[Sn,sup] ≤ n−n
(
k−1−o(1)
)
.
(ii) If min(k1, k2) = 1 and k := max(k1, k2) > 1, then
[e2(k − 1)!]−n ≤ E[Sn,s] = E[Sn,sup] ≤ (ρk + o(1))n,
ρk := e
−1
∫ 1
0
ez/2z−1
logk−1(1− z)−1
(k − 1)! dz ≤ ρ2 < 0.83.
Thus, for max(k1, k2) > 1, the weakly stable matchings are, on average,
super-exponentially numerous. In stark contrast, when min(k1, k2) > 1 as
well, the fractions of problem instances with at least one strongly stable
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or super-stable matchings vanish at a super-exponential rate, particularly
fast in the case of super-stability. Even in the most favorable case, when
min(k1, k2) = 1, the fraction of solvable instances, for either strongly stable
or super-stable matchings, is exponentially small.
2. Cyclic stable matchings.
Suppose the n complete preference lists for agents in As+1 by agents in
As (s ∈ [r],Ar+1 := Ar), rn lists in total, are chosen uniformly at random
and independently of each other. For simplicity of notations, the sets As
are copies of the set [n].
Lemma 2.1. Let M be an arbitrary matching on ∪s∈[r]As, and let P(M) be
the probability that M is weakly stable. Introducing x(s) = {x(s)1 , . . . , x(s)n } ∈
[0, 1]n, (s ∈ [r]), we have
(2.1)
P(M) ≥
∫
· · ·
∫
x(1),...,x(r)∈[0,1]n
F (x(1), . . . ,x(r)) dx(1) · · · , dx(r),
F (x(1), . . . ,x(r)) =
∏
i1,...,ir∈[n]
i1 6=···6=ir 6=i1
(
1−
∏
s∈[r]
x
(s)
is
)
.
Note. This Lemma extends an identity
(2.2) P(M) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x,y∈[0,1]n
∏
i 6=j
(
1− xiyj
)
dx dy,
found by Knuth [11] for the case r = 2, i.e. the bipartite matchings. An
alternative derivation of (2.2) was given later in [18]. The proof of (2.1) is
patterned after that in [18].
Proof. By the definition of weak stability, we have
{M w-stable} =
⋂
as∈As, s∈[r]
M(as) 6=as+1
{
a2
a1≺M(a1), a3
a2≺M(a2), · · · , a1
ar≺M(ar)
}c
.
In words, there is no cyclic tuple a1 → a2 → · · · → ar → a1, such that
each as strictly prefers as+1 to his successor M(as) in M . By symmetry,
P(M) does not depend on the choice of M . So we consider M consisting of
r-tuples (i, . . . , i), i ∈ [n].
To lower-bound P(M), we refine the probability space of the rn indepen-
dent uniform preferences. Let X(s) = {X(s)i,j }, (s ∈ [r]), be the n×nmatrices
whose rn2 entries are independent [0, 1]-Uniforms. Reading the entries, from
row 1 to row n, in every one of rn rows in the increasing order, starting with
X(1) and ending with X(r), we obtain the preference lists of agents from As
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for agents in As+1, s ∈ [r]. These lists are clearly independent and uniform.
Therefore
{M w-stable} =
⋂
i1,...,ir∈[n]
i1 6=i2 6=···6=ir 6=i1
{
X
(1)
i1,i2
< X
(1)
i1,i1
,X
(2)
i2,i3
< X
(2)
i2,i2
,
. . . , X
(r)
ir ,i1
< X
(r)
ir ,ir
}c
.
Given x(1), . . . ,x(r) ∈ [0, 1]n, we will use “|◦” to indicate conditioning on
the event
⋂
s∈[r],i∈[n]{X(s)i,i = x(s)i }. Since X(s)i,j , (i 6= j), remain independent,
[0, 1]-Uniforms upon conditioning “|◦”, we have then
P
({
X
(1)
i1,i2
< X
(1)
i1,i1
, X
(2)
i2,i3
< X
(2)
i2,i2
, . . . , X
(r)
ir ,i1
< X
(r)
ir ,ir
}c∣∣∣◦)
= P
({
X
(1)
i1,i2
< x
(1)
i1
, X
(2)
i2,i3
< x
(2)
i2
, . . . , X
(r)
ir ,i1
< x
(r)
ir
}c)
= 1−
∏
s∈[r]
x
(s)
is
.
As for the events E(i) :=
{
X
(1)
i1,i2
< x
(1)
i1
, X
(2)
i2,i3
< x
(2)
i2
, . . . , X
(r)
ir ,i1
< x
(r)
ir
}c
,
(i1 6= i2 6= · · · 6= ir 6= i1), they are interdependent: E(i) and E(i′) are in-
dependent only if the cyclic tuples i and i′ do not share a common edge.
Fortunately, each of the events E(i) is monotone increasing with respect to
X
(i1)
i1,i2
, . . . ,X
(r)
ir ,i1
. Since all X
(s)
i,j , (ı 6= j), remain independent upon con-
ditioning |◦, the events E(i) are positively associated (see Grimmett and
Stirzaker [8]), yielding
P(M is stable|◦) ≥
∏
i1,...,ir∈[n]
i1 6=···6=ir 6=i1
(
1−
∏
s∈[r]
x
(s)
is
)
.
Taking expectations of both sides of this inequality we come to (2.1). 
We use Lemma 2.1 to prove
Theorem 2.2. Let Sn denote the total number of weakly stable matchings.
Then
E[Sn] & (cr + o(1))
(
n log n
2
)r−1
, cr := P(Tr−1 ∈ [1, 2]),
where Tr−1 =
∑
j∈[r−1] Yj , and Yj are independent [0, 1]-uniform random
variables.
Proof. To lower-bound the integral in (2.1), we switch to the rn variables
ξ(s), {u(s)i }i∈[n−1], (s ∈ [r]):
(2.3) ξ(s) =
∑
i∈[n]
x
(s)
i , u
(s)
i =
x
(s)
i
ξ(s)
, (i ∈ [n− 1]).
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We introduce the missing u
(s)
n =
x
(s)
n
ξ(s)
and get
(2.4)
∑
i∈[n]
u
(s)
i = 1, ξ
(s) ≤ n, u(s)i ξ(s) ≤ 1.
The Jacobian of the inverse transformation is
(∏
s∈[r] ξ
(s)
)n−1
. We consider
the subset Ω(n) of the region in (2.4) where
nα ≤ ξ(s) ≤ nβ, (0 < α < β < 1/2),(2.5)
u
(s)
i ≤
2 log n
n
, i ∈ [n], s ∈ [r],(2.6) ∑
i∈[n]
(u
(s)
i )
2 ≤ 3
n
.(2.7)
The bounds (2.5), (2.6) imply the inequalities in (2.4), with plenty of room
to spare. For (ξ(s),u(s))s∈[r] meeting (2.5), (2.6), we have∏
s∈[r]
x
(s)
is
=
∏
s∈[r]
ξ(s)u
(s)
i ≤
(
nβ · 2 log n
n
)r
= O
(
n−r(1−β) logr n
)
= o(1).
So, using also log(1− z) = −z +O(z2), (z → 0), and (2.7), we obtain∑
i1,...,ir∈[n]
i1 6=···6=ir 6=i1
log
(
1−
∏
s∈[r]
x
(s)
is
)
≥
∑
i1,...,ir∈[n]
log
(
1−
∏
s∈[r]
x
(s)
is
)
= −
∑
i1,...,ir∈[n]
∏
s∈[r]
x
(s)
is
+
∑
i1,...,ir∈[n]
O

∏
s∈[r]
(
x
(s)
is
)2
= −
∏
s∈[r]
ξ(s) +O
(
n−r(1−2β)
)
= −
∏
s∈[r]
ξ(s) + o(1),
since β < 1/2. The top inequality comes from dropping the constraint
”i1 6= · · · 6= ir 6= i1”. Our focus will be on
∏
s ξ
(s) = Θ(n), in which case the
conditions nα ≤ ξ(s) and (2.6) imply that the resulting additive difference is
of order n−α log n = o(1).
Therefore, by 2.1, we have:
(2.8)
P(M) ≥ (1 + o(1))
∫
· · ·
∫
{ξ(s)}s∈[r] meet (2.5)
exp
(
−
∏
s∈[r]
ξ(s)
)(∏
s∈[r]
ξ(s)
)n−1∏
s∈[r]
dξ(s)
×
∫
· · ·
∫
{u(s)}s∈[r] meet (2.6),(2.7)
1 ·
∏
s∈[r]
du(s).
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(1) Consider the first integral. Keeping the variables ξ := {ξ(s)}s∈[r−1], we
introduce σ :=
(∏
s∈[r] ξ
(s)
)1/r
instead of ξ(r). The corresponding Jacobian
is rσr−1/
∏
s∈[r−1] ξ
(s). The integral becomes
(2.9)
∫
· · ·
∫
ξ∈[nα,nβ ]r−1
∏
s∈[r−1]
dξ(s)
ξ(s)
(nβ
∏
s∈[r−1] ξ
(s))
1/r∫
(nα
∏
s∈[r−1] ξ
(s))
1/r
r σr−1 e−σ
r+r(n−1) log σ dσ.
φ(σ) := −σr + r(n− 1) log σ is concave, and attains its absolute maximum
at σ∗ := (n− 1)1/r, so that φ(σ∗) = −(n− 1) + (n− 1) log(n− 1). Now
φ′′(σ) = −r(r − 1)σr−2 − r(n− 1)
σ2
=⇒ φ′′(σ∗) = −r2(n− 1) r−2r .
Since r ≥ 3, we have φ′′(σ) = −Θ(n r−2r ) → −∞, for σ ∈ [0.5σ∗, 2σ∗]. It
follows, by the standard Gaussian approximation, that if
(2.10) (σ∗ − σ1)n
r−2
2r , (σ2 − σ∗)n
r−2
2r →∞,
then∫ σ2
σ1
r σr−1 exp
(−σr + r(n− 1) log σ) dσ
= (1 + o(1))r(σ∗)r−1eφ(σ
∗)
√
2π
−φ′′(σ∗)
= (1 + o(1))
√
2πn
(
n− 1
e
)n−1
= (1 + o(1))(n − 1)! .
In view of the innermost integration limits in (2.9), σi are given by
σ1(ξ) =
(
nα
∏
s∈[r−1]
ξ(s)
)1/r
, σ2(ξ) =
(
nβ
∏
s∈[r−1]
ξ(s)
)1/r
.
The conditions (2.10) will easily hold if
(2.11) 2n1−β ≤
r−1∏
s=1
ξ(s) ≤ 0.5n1−α.
So, uniformly for ξ meeting this condition, the innermost integral is asymp-
totic to (n − 1)!. It remains to estimate the integral obtained from the one
in (2.9) by replacing the innermost integral with (n − 1)!, and adding the
constraint (2.11) to the integration range of ξ. Introducing the new vari-
ables y(s) = log ξ(s)/(β log n), (s ∈ [r − 1]), we obtain an asymptotic lower
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bound for the integral in (2.9):
(n− 1)!(log n)r−1βr−1
∫
· · ·
∫
y∈[α/β,1]r−1
(1−β)/β≤
∑
s y
(s)≤(1−α)/β
1 ·
∏
s∈[r−1]
dy(s)
= (n− 1)!(log n)r−1βr−1P(Tr−1 ∈ [(1− β)/β, (1 − α)/β]);
here Tr−1 =
∑
s∈[r−1] Y
(s), and Y (s) are independent, [0, 1]-Uniforms. Push-
ing α toward 0 and β toward 1/2, we can make this estimate arbitrarily close
to
(2.12) (n− 1)!
(
log n
2
)r−1
P(Tr−1 ∈ [1, 2]).
(2) Turn to the second integral in (2.8). Observe that
(n − 1)! · I
( ∑
ν∈[n−1]
ℓν ≤ 1
)
is the joint density of the lengths L1, . . . , Ln−1 of the first n − 1 intervals
obtained by throwing uniformly at random n − 1 points into the interval
[0, 1]. Therefore, by the definition of constraints (2.6), (2.7) we have
(2.13)
∫
· · ·
∫
{u(s)}s∈[r−1] meet (2.6),(2.7)
1 ·
∏
s∈[r−1]
du(s)
=
1(
(n− 1)!)r Pr

max
ν∈[n]
Lν ≤ 2 log n
n
,
∑
ν∈[n]
L2ν ≤
3
n


= (1 + o(1))
1(
(n − 1)!)r ,
for the last equality see Pittel [18].
Multiplying the lower bounds (2.12) and (2.13) we obtain
P(M) ≥ (1 + o(1)
(
log n
2(n− 1)!
)r−1
P(Tr−1 ∈ [1, 2]).
Finally
E[Sn] = (n!)
r−1
P(M) ≥ (1 + o(1))
(
n log n
2
)r−1
P(Tr−1 ∈ [1, 2]).

Note. The condition r ≥ 3 played an important role in the proof, making
φ
′′
(σ∗) = −Θ(n r−2r ) → −∞, and enabling us to claim that the dominant
contribution to the innermost integral in (2.9) came from σs within a factor
1 + o(1) from σ∗. For r = 2 this is not true, since φ
′′
(σ∗) = O(1).
12 BORIS PITTEL
3. Two-side stable matchings with partially ordered
preferences.
We have two agent sets, A1 and A2, which are copies of [n]. Suppose
that the preference lists of n agents from A1 (from A2 resp.) for a marriage
partner in A2 (in A1 resp.) are n independent copies of Pk1(n) (Pk2(n)
resp.), where Pk(n) is the uniformly random k-dimensional partial order on
[n], Winkler [25]. (In addition, the n copies of Pk1(n) are independent of
the n copies of Pk2(n).)
A generic Pk(n) is constructed by taking k linear orders on the set [n],
uniformly and independently at random, from the set of all n! linear or-
ders, and forming the intersection of k orders. Equivalently, Pk(n) can
be generated by throwing n points Z(1), . . . ,Z(n), uniformly and indepen-
dently of each other, into the cube [0, 1]k, equipped with the coordinate
(linear) order , and taking the order P on the n points induced by .
Uniformity of Z(j) means that its coordinates Z
(j)
1 , . . . , Z
(j)
k are independent
[0, 1]-Uniforms. The k coordinate orders P1, . . . ,Pk are independent of each
other, and P = ∩kj=1Pj, whence P = Pk(n). Neglecting a zero-probability
event, we have
(3.1) {Z(α)  Z(β)} = {Z(α) < Z(β)} :=
⋂
u∈[k]
{Z(α)u < Z(β)u }.
Back to A1 and A2, we introduce Xi = {X(j)i }j∈A2 , (i ∈ A1), and Yj =
{Y(i)j }i∈A1 , (j ∈ A2), such that all X(j)i and Y(i)j are independent, and
each X
(j)
i is [0, 1]
k1 -uniform, while each of Y
(i)
j is [0, 1]
k2 -uniform. For each
i ∈ A1 (j ∈ A2 resp.) the n-long sequenceXi (Yj resp.) induces the random
partial order Pi,k1(n) on A2 (Pj,k2(n) on A1 resp.), with all the partial orders
independent of each other. That’s our stable matching problem with random
partially ordered preference lists.
Let M be the bijective mapping from A1 to A2, such that, numerically
M(i) = i, (i ∈ [n]), so that M−1(j) = j, (j ∈ [n]).
M is weakly stable (w-stable) if no unmatched pair i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2 is
such that i strictly prefers j to its partner M(i) and j strictly prefers i to
its partner M−1(j). So by (3.1), we have
{M w-stable} =
⋂
i∈A1, j∈A2
i6=j
{
X
(j)
i < X
(i)
i , Y
(i)
j < Y
(j)
j
}c
.
Conditioned on the event
{X(α)α = xα,Y(β)β = yβ}α∈A1,β∈A2 , xα={xα,u}∈ [0, 1]k1 , yβ={yβ,v}∈ [0, 1]k2 ,
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the events in the above intersection are independent. Therefore, using |◦ to
denote the conditioning, we have
(3.2) P(M w-stable|◦)
=
∏
i∈A1, j∈A2
i6=j
(
1− P(X(j)i < X(i)i , Y(i)j < Y(j)j |◦))
=
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
(
1−
∏
u∈[k1]
xi,u ·
∏
v∈[k2]
yj,v
)
.
Next, M is strongly stable (s-stable) if no unmatched pair i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2
is such that either i strictly prefers j to its partner M(i) and j does not
strictly prefer its partner M−1(j) to i, or j strictly prefers i to its partner
M−1(j) and i does not strictly prefer its partner M(i) to j. Therefore
{M s-stable}
=
⋂
i∈A1, j∈A2
i6=j
({
X
(j)
i < X
(i)
i , Y
(i)
j 6> Y(j)j
}⋃{
X
(j)
i 6> X(i)i , Y(i)j < Y(j)j
})c
.
Therefore
(3.3) P(M s-stable|◦) =
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
[
1−
∏
u∈[k1]
xi,u ·
(
1−
∏
v∈[k2]
(1 − yj,v)
)
−
∏
v∈[k2]
yj,v ·
(
1−
∏
u∈[k1]
(1− xi,u)
)
+
∏
u∈[k1]
xi,u ·
∏
v∈[k2]
yj,v
]
.
Finally, M is super-stable (sup-stable) if no unmatched pair i ∈ A1, j ∈
A2 is such that i does not strictly prefer M(i) to j and j does not strictly
prefer M−1(j) to i. Therefore
{M sup-stable} =
⋂
i∈A1, j∈A2
i6=j
{
X
(i)
i 6< X(j)i , Y(j)j 6< Y(i)j
}c
,
so that
(3.4)
P(M sup-stable|◦) =
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
[
1− P(X(i)i 6< X(j)i |◦)P(Y(j)j 6< Y(i)j |◦)]
=
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
[
1−
(
1−
∏
u∈[k1]
(1− xi,u)
)(
1−
∏
v∈[k2]
(1− yj,v)
)]
.
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Let x = {xα}α∈A1 , y = {yβ}β∈A2 , so that x ∈ [0, 1]nk1 , y ∈ [0, 1]nk2 .
Unconditioning (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4), we have proved
Lemma 3.1.
Pk1,k2(M w-stable) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]nk1 , y∈[0,1]nk2
F1(x,y) dx dy,
Pk1,k2(M s-stable) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]nk1 , y∈[0,1]nk2
F2(x,y) dx dy,
Pk1,k2(M sup-stable) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]nk1 , y∈[0,1]nk2
F3(x,y) dx dy,
with F1, F2 and F3 being the RHS expressions in (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4). For
k1 = k2 = 1, all three functions collapse into F (x,y) =
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n(1−xiyj).
In addition, F2(x,y) = F3(x,y) for k2 = 1. This is not surprising since for
k2 = 1 super-stability is the same as strong stability.
By symmetry, these probabilities do not depend on the choice of a match-
ing M . Let Sn,w, Sn,s and Sn,sup denote the total number of weakly stable,
strongly stable and super stable matchings. Then Lemma 3.1 implies
(3.5)
E[Sn,w] = n!
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]nk1 ,y∈[0,1]nk2
F1(x,y) dx dy,
E[Sn,s] = n!
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]nk1 ,y∈[0,1]nk2
F2(x,y) dx dy,
E[Sn,sup] = n!
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]nk1 ,y∈[0,1]nk2
F3(x,y) dx dy.
In [18] for k1 = k2 = 1, i.e. for the random totally ordered preference lists,
we proved that E[Sn] ∼ e−1n log n. We will analyze asymptotics of the three
expectations for {k1, k2} 6= {1, 1}.
Observe that the two random orders on [n], of dimension k1 and k1+1, can
be naturally coupled in such a way that the latter is the intersection of the
former and the random independent total order. Weak stability of a given
matching M means that there are no destabilizing unmatched pairs, i.e.
strictly preferring each other to their partners in the matching. Under the
coupling, the set of pairs destabilizing M for the (k1+1, k2)-problem is con-
tained in the set of pairs destabilizing M for the (k1, k2)-problem. It follows
that Pk1,k2(M w-stable) ≤ Pk1+1,k2(M w-stable), i.e. Pk1,k2(M w-stable) is
an increasing function of k1, k2.
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On the other hand, super-stability of M means absence of a radically
less selective set of unmatched pairs: a pair (i, j) is classified as destabi-
lizing if neither i strictly prefer M(i) to j, nor j strictly prefers M−1(j)
to i. Under the coupling, this set is increasing with k1 and k2. Therefore
Pk1,k2(M sup-stable) is a decreasing function of k1, k2.
3.1. Super-stable matchings. First, let us upper-bound F3(x,y) defined
in (3.4). Using the geometric-arithmetic mean inequality, we have
(3.6)
∏
u∈[k1]
(1− xi,u) ≤

1− 1
k1
∑
u∈[k1]
xi,u

k1 ≤ 1− 1
k1
∑
u∈[k1]
xi,u,
and likewise ∏
v∈[k2]
(1− yj,v) ≤ 1− 1
k2
∑
v∈[k2]
yj,v.
(3.7) F3(x,y) ≤
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
[
1− 1
k1k2
( ∑
u∈[k1]
xi,u
)
·
( ∑
v∈[k2]
yj,v
)]
.
Let fk(z) denote the density of
∑
w∈[k]Zw, Zw being independent [0, 1]-
Uniforms. Introducing ξ = {ξα}α∈A1 , η = {ηβ}β∈A2 , ξ ∈ [0, k1]n, η ∈
[0, k2]
n, we obtain from (3.5) that
E[Sn,sup] ≤ n! In, In :=
∫
· · ·
∫
ξ∈[0,k1]n,η∈[0,k2]n
F ∗3 (ξ,η) dξ dη,(3.8)
F ∗3 (ξ,η) =
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
(
1− ξiηj
k1k2
)
·
∏
i∈[n]
fk1(ξi) ·
∏
j∈[n]
fk2(ηj).(3.9)
Suppose k1 > 1. Using 1− ζ ≤ e−ζ and fk2(η) ≤ ηk2−1/(k2− 1)!, we have
(3.10)
In ≤
∫
· · ·
∫
ξ∈[0,k1]n
(
n∏
j=1
∫ k2
0
exp
(
− ηsj
k1k2
)
ηk2−1
(k2 − 1)! dη
) ∏
i∈[n]
fk1(ξi) dξ,
sj :=
∑
i 6=j
ξi.
Fix a ∈ (0, 1) and write In = In,1 + In,2 where In,1 is the contribution of
ξ with s :=
∑
i∈[n] ξi ≤ na, and In,2 is the contribution of ξ with s > na.
Introducing γ := kk2−12 /(k2 − 1)! and integrating e−ηsj/k1k2 , we obtain
In,1 ≤ γn1
∫
· · ·
∫
s≤na
∏
j∈[n]
1− exp(−sj/k1)
sj/k1
∏
i∈[n]
fk1(ξi) dξ, γ1 = k2γ.
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Now
(3.11)
(
log
1− e−z
z
)′
= −e
z − 1− z
z(ez − 1)
= −
∑
j≥2 z
j/j!∑
j≥2 z
j/(j − 1)! ∈ [−maxj≥2 1/j, 0] = [−1/2, 0].
Using this inequality and s− sj = ξj, we have
(3.12) log
1− exp(−sj/k1)
sj/k1
≤ 1− exp
(−s/k1)
s/k1
+
1
2k1
ξj ,
implying that
(3.13)
∑
j∈[n]
log
1− exp(−sj/k1)
sj/k1
≤ n log 1− exp
(−s/k1))
s/k1
+
1
2k1
s.
Therefore
In,1 ≤ γn1
∫
· · ·
∫
s≤na
(
1− e−s/k1
s/k1
)n
es/2k1
∏
i∈[n]
fk1(ξi) dξ
= γn1 · E
[(
1− e−Sn/k1
Sn/k1
)n
· eSn/2k1 · I(Sn ≤ na)
]
,
where Sn is the sum of k1n independent [0, 1]-Uniforms. So, since the density
of Sn is bounded by sk1n−1/(k1n− 1)!, we drop (1− e−Sn/k1)n and obtain
In,1 ≤ γn1 kn1 ecn
a/k1
∫ na
0
s(k1−1)n−1
(k1n− 1)! ds
≤ (γ1k1 + o(1))n · n
a(k1−1)n
(k1n)!
≤ γn2 · nn[a(k1−1)−k1], (γ2 := 3γ1),
as (k1n)! > (k1n/e)
k1n. Therefore
(3.14) n! · In,1 ≤ γn2 · nn(k1−1)(a−1) → 0,
since k1 > 1 and a < 1.
Turn to In,2. We estimate∫ k2
0
e
−
ηsj
k1k2
ηk2−1
(k2 − 1)! dη ≤
(
k1k2
sj
)k2 ∫ ∞
0
e−z
zk2−1
(k2 − 1)! dz =
(
k1k2
sj
)k2
,
implying that
In,2 ≤
∫
· · ·
∫
s>na
∏
j∈[n]
(
k1k2
sj
)k2 ∏
i∈[n]
fk1(ξi) dξ.
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Since s ≥ na, we have
(3.15)
∏
j∈[n]
s−1j = s
−n exp
(
1 +O(n−a)
)
.
Therefore, picking γ3 > (k1k2)
k2 , and γ4 > γ3(e
k1/k1k2), we have: for n
large enough,
In,2 ≤ γn3
∫
· · ·
∫
s>na
s−k2n
∏
i∈[n]
fk1(ξi) dξ
≤ γn3
∫ k1n
nα
s(k1−k2)n−1
(k1n− 1)! ds ≤ γ
n
4 n
−k2n.
Consequently
(3.16) n! · In,2 ≤ γn4 n−(k2−1)n.
Combining (3.14) and (3.16), we arrive at
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that k1, k2 ≥ 2. Then
E[Sn,sup] ≤ n−n
[
min(k1−1,k2−1)−o(1)
]
,
implying (by Markov inequality) that
P(Sn,sup > 0) ≤ n−n
[
min(k1−1,k2−1)−o(1)
]
.
In words, the fraction of problem instances with at least one super-stable
matching is super-exponentially small.
Consider the remaining case k1 ≥ 2 and k2 = 1. Here {yj,v} = yj,1 =: yj,
and so
F3(x,y) =
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
[
1− yj
(
1−
∏
u∈[k1]
(1− xi,u)
)]
.
∏
u∈[k1]
(1 − xi,u) can be viewed as the generic value of
∏
i∈[k1]
(1 − Xi,u),
Xi,u being independent Uniforms. Obviously 1−Xi,u are also independent
Uniforms. It is known that the product of k independent [0, 1]-Uniforms has
density φk(z) := [log
k−1(1/z)]/(k − 1)!. (A simple inductive proof is based
on a recurrence
fk(z) =
∫ 1
z
η−1fk−1(z/η) dη.)
Then 1 minus the random product has density ψk(z) =
logk−1(1−z)−1
(k−1)! , (z ∈
(0, 1]), and we are back to the uniform density if k = 1. So, introducing the
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sequence {Zi}i∈[n] of independent random variables with common density
ψk1(z) we obtain that
(3.17) E[Sn,sup] = n! · In, In := E
[ ∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
(
1− YjZi
)]
;
here Yj are [0, 1]-Uniforms, which are independent among themselves and
from {Zi}. Analogously to (3.10), we write
In ≤
∫
· · ·
∫
z∈[0,1]n
(
n∏
j=1
∫ 1
0
e−ysj dy
) ∏
i∈[n]
ψk1(zi) dz, sj :=
∑
i 6=j
zi.
The innermost integral is (1 − e−sj )/sj ; so arguing as in (3.11)-(3.13), we
obtain
In ≤
∫
· · ·
∫
z∈[0,1]n
es/2
(
1− e−s
s
)n ∏
i∈[n]
ψk1(zi) dz, s :=
∑
i∈[n]
zi.
Unlike the case of the uniform density, we have no tractable upper bound
for the n-th order convolution of the density ψk1(z) with itself. Fortunately
(1− e−s)/s is log-convex:(
log(1− e−s)− log s
)′′
= s−2 − (es/2 − e−s/2)−2 > 0.
(Alternatively, this function is the Laplace transform of the uniform density,
and it is known that Laplace transform of any nonnegative function is log-
convex.) Therefore(
1− e−s
s
)n
≤
∏
i∈[n]
1− e−nzi
nzi
≤
∏
i∈[n]
1
nzi
,
so that
In ≤ n−nJnk1 , Jk1 :=
∫ 1
0
ez/2 z−1ψk1(z) dz.
Consequently
E[Sn,sup] ≤ n! In = O(n1/2ρnk1), ρk = e−1Jk.
By Maple: ρ2 = 0.8287956957, ρ3 = 0.8287956957, ρ4 = 0.6329102250.
In general, ρk decreases with k increasing, because 1 −
∏
u∈[k]Xu ≤ 1 −∏
i∈[k+1]Xu, and z
−1ez/2 is decreasing for z ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore we have
proved
Lemma 3.3. Suppose min(k1, k2) = 1 and k := max(k1, k2) > 1. Then for
n large enough we have E[Sn,sup] ≤ (ρk + o(1))n, ρk decreases with k and
ρ2 < 0.83.
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A sharp contrast between the bounds in Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 raises
the question: is E[Sn,sup] exactly exponentially small under the conditions of
Lemma 3.3? To answer positively, we need a sufficiently sharp lower bound
for In in (3.17). We start with a bound
In := E
[ ∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
(
1− YjZi
)]
≥ I∗n,
I∗n := E
[
I
(
max Yj ≤ β; minZi ≥ 1− e−1
) · ∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
(
1− YjZi
)]
;
here
β = 1− αˆ
α
, α > 1 and αˆe−αˆ = αe−α,
so that αˆ < 1. For this pair (α, β), we have: if Yj ≤ β, then 1 − YjZi ≥
e−αYjZi .
(Indeed, for η ≤ β, we have
α ≥ α(1− η) ≥ α(1 − β) = αˆ.
Therefore
(1− η)eαη = α(1 − η)e−α(1−η) · α−1eα ≥ αˆe−αˆ · α−1eα = 1.)
The constraint minZi ≥ 1 − e−1 is imposed because the density ψk1(z) is
log-convex for z ∈ [1 − e−1, 1), a property we use in the second line below.
Consequently
I∗n ≥
∫
· · ·
∫
z∈[1−e−1,1]n
(∫ β
0
e−αys dy
)n ∏
i∈[n]
ψk1(zi) dz
≥
∫
· · ·
∫
z∈[1−e−1,1]n
(
1− e−αβs
αs
)n
· ψnk1(s/n) dz
≥
(
1− e−αβn(1−e−1)
αn
)n[
(k1 − 1)!
]−n · ∫ · · · ∫
z∈[1−e−1,1]n
1 dz
≥ 0.5(αe(k1 − 1)!n)−n,
if n is large. Therefore
E[Sn,sup] ≥ n! I∗n ≥ 0.5
(
αe2(k1 − 1)!
)−n
,
for every α > 1 if n ≥ n(α). Thus
Lemma 3.4. Under the conditions of Lemma 3.3, we have
E[Sn,sup] ≥ (rk − o(1))n, rk :=
(
e2(k1 − 1)!
)−1
.
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In summary, we have proved
Theorem 3.5. If min(k1, k2) > 1, then the fraction of problem instances
with at least one super-stable matching is at most n−n
[
min(k1−1,k2−1)−o(1)
]
. If
min(k1, k2) = 1 and max(k1, k2) > 1 then the fraction of problem instances
with at least one super-stable matching is between (rk − o(1))n and (ρk +
o(1))n, where 0 < rk < ρk < 1 and rk, ρk decrease as k increases.
3.2. Strongly stable matchings. First of all,
Lemma 3.6. If k := max(k1, k2) > 1 and min(k1, k2) = 1. Then for n large
enough we have E[Sn,s] ∈ [(rk − o(1))n, 0.83n].
The proof is immediate since F2(x,y) = F3(x,y) if min(k1, k2) = 1.
It remains to consider the case min(k1, k2) > 1. Let us upper-bound
E[Sn,s]. Recall (see (3.3)) that
F2(x,y) =
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
[
1−
∏
u∈[k1]
xi,u ·
(
1−
∏
v∈[k2]
(1− yj,v)
)
−
∏
v∈[k2]
yj,v ·
(
1−
∏
u∈[k1]
(1− xi,u)
)
+
∏
u∈[k1]
xi,u ·
∏
v∈[k2]
yj,v
]
.
We need to find a tractable upper bound for F2(x,y).
Lemma 3.7. If zℓ ∈ [0, 1], (ℓ ∈ [k]), then
∏
ℓ∈[k]
(1− zℓ) ≤
[
1−
(∏
ℓ∈[k]
zℓ
)1/k ]k
≤ 1−
(∏
ℓ∈[k]
zℓ
)1/k
.
Proof. If, given p ∈ (0, 1),
max

∑
ℓ
log(1− zℓ) : zℓ ∈ (0, 1);
∑
ℓ∈[k]
log zℓ ≥ log p

 = k log(1− p1/k),
then the claim follows immediately. Since
∑
ℓ log(1− zℓ) is concave and the
range of z is convex, it suffices to produce λ ≥ 0 such that z∗ℓ ≡ p1/k is a
stationary point of the Lagrange function
∑
ℓ log(1− zℓ) + λ
∑
ℓ∈[k] log zℓ in
the open cube (0, 1)n. The needed λ is p1/k/(1− p1/k). 
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Using Lemma 3.7, we have
F2(x,y) ≤
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
[
1−
∏
u∈[k1]
xi,u ·
( ∏
v∈[k2]
yj,v
)1/k2
−
∏
v∈[k2]
yj,v ·
( ∏
u∈[k1]
xi,u
)1/k1
+
∏
u∈[k1]
xi,u ·
∏
v∈[k2]
yj,v
]
.
The bound looks promising as it depends only on 2n products P (xi) =∏
u∈[k1]
xi,u, P (yj) =
∏
v∈[k2]
yj,v. Observe that with k := min(k1, k2)
P (xi)P (yj)
1/k2 + P (xi)
1/k1P (yj)− P (xi)P (yj)
≥ P (xi)P (yj)1/k + P (xi)1/kP (yj)− P (xi)P (yj)
≥ 2
[
P (xi)P (yj)
] k+1
2k − P (xi)P (yj) ≥
[
P (xi)P (yj)
] k+1
2k
.
Introduce independent random variables X1, . . . ,Xn with density φk1(z) =
logk1−1(1/z)
(k1−1)!
, and Y1, . . . , Yn with density φk2(z) =
logk2−1(1/z)
(k2−1)!
. It follows that
(3.18) E[Sn,s] ≤ n! In, In := E
[ ∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
(
1−Xαi Y αj
)]
, α :=
k + 1
2k
.
So, mimicking (3.10), we have
(3.19)
In ≤
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
(∏
j∈[n]
∫ 1
0
e−sjy
α
φk2(y) dy
) ∏
i∈[n]
φk1(xi) dx,
sj :=
∑
i 6=j
xαi .
Let s =
∑
i∈[n] x
α
i . Since
d
dz
log
(∫ 1
0
e−zy
α
φk2(y) dy
)
= −
∫ 1
0 e
−zyα yα φk2(y) dy∫ 1
0 e
−zyαφk2(y) dy
∈ [−1, 0],
we obtain ∫ 1
0
e−sjy
α
φk2(y) dy ≤ exp
(
xαj
) ∫ 1
0
e−sy
α
φk2(y) dy,
implying that
(3.20)
∏
j∈[n]
∫ 1
0
e−y
αsjφk2(y) dy ≤ en
(∫ 1
0
e−y
αsφk2(y) dy
)n
.
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Now
∫ 1
0 e
−syαφk(y) dy is a slightly-disguised Laplace transform of a non-
negative function, whence it is log-convex. Therefore
(3.21)
(∫ 1
0
e−sy
α
φk(y) dy
)n
≤
∏
i∈[n]
∫ 1
0
e−y
αnxαi φk(y) dy.
Combining (3.19)-(3.20), we obtain
(3.22)
In ≤ en
(∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
e−n(xy)
α
φk1(x)φk2(y) dxdy
)n
= en
(∫ 1
0
e−nz
α
φk1+k2(z) dz
)n
, α =
k + 1
2k
.
Indeed, φk1(x)φk2(y) is the joint density of X , Y, the product of k inde-
pendent Uniforms and the product of another k2 independent Uniforms,
respectively. So the double integral is E[e−n(XY)
α
] = E[e−nZ
α
], where Z is
the product of k1 + k2 independent Uniforms. Substituting nz
α = η, we
obtain that the integral is asymptotic to
n−1/a
(α−1 log n)k1+k2−1
(k1 + k2 − 1)! ·
1
α
∫ ∞
0
e−η η1/α−1 dη = c1n
−1/α(log n)k1+k2−1.
Recalling that α = (k + 1)/2k, it follows that
E[Sn,s] ≤ n!en
[
c1n
−1/a(log n)k1+k2−1
]n
= O
(
n1/2(log n)k1+k2−1cn1n
− k−1
k+1
n
)
.
We have proved
Lemma 3.8. If k := min(k1, k2) > 1, then E[Sn,s] ≤ n−n
(
k−1
k+1
−o(1)
)
.
In summary, we have
Theorem 3.9. If k := min(k1, k2) > 1, then the fraction of problem in-
stances with at least one strongly stable matching is at most n−n
[
k−1
k+1
−o(1)
]
.
If min(k1, k2) = 1 and kmax := max(k1, k2) > 1 then the fraction of problem
instances with at least one strongly stable matching is at most 0.83n, and at
least [e2(kmax − 1)!]−n.
Note. For k = min(k1, k2) > 1 the fractions of solvable problem instances
are super-exponentially small for both super-stable solutions and strongly
stable solutions. The difference is that for the former this fraction is around
n−n(k−1), while for the latter the still minuscule fraction is much larger,
around n−n
k−1
k+1 .
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3.3. Weakly stable matchings. According to (3.5) and (3.2), we have
(3.23)
E[Sn,w] = n!
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]nk1 ,y∈[0,1]nk2
F1(x,y) dx dy,
F1(x,y) :=
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
(
1−
∏
u∈[k1]
xi,u ·
∏
v∈[k2]
yj,v
)
,
with Sn,w denoting the total number of weakly stable matchings. This time
E[Sn,w] ≥ E[Sn], which is the expected number of stable matchings with
random totally ordered preference lists, and it is asymptotic to e−1n log n.
E[Sn,w] is expected to grow faster with n, but how much faster?
(i) Upper bound. Instead of the “hard-won” inequality (3.18), now, ac-
cording to (3.23)-(3.19), we have the analogous equality from the start:
(3.24)
E[Sn,w] = n! In, In := E
[ ∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
(
1−Xi Yj
)]
,
In ≤
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
(∏
j∈[n]
∫ 1
0
e−sjyφk2(y) dy
) ∏
i∈[n]
φk1(xi) dx,
sj :=
∑
i 6=j
xi.
Following the steps that led us to (3.22), we obtain
In ≤ enKnn ,
Kn :=
∫ 1
0
e−nzφk1+k2(z) dz ∼ n−1
(log n)k1+k2−1
(k1 + k2 − 1)! .
We conclude that
(3.25) E[Sn,w] ≤ (log n)(k1+k2−1+o(1))n.
(ii) Lower bound. Let k1 ≥ k2. We start with
In ≥ E
[
I
(
max
i
Xi ≤ e−1), max
j
Yj ≤ β
) ∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
(
1−Xi Yj
)]
,
the constraint on maxiXi being dictated by log-convexity of φk1(x) for x ∈
(0, e−1]. As for the constraint on maxj Yj, we need it to have the bound
1− YjXi ≥ e−αXiYj , α > 1, β := 1− αˆ/α.
So, with s :=
∑
i∈[n] xi,
In ≥
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,e−1]n
(∫ β
0
e−αsyφk2(y) dy
)n(
φk1(s/n)
)n
dx.
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Since the density of the sum of n independent Uniforms is sn−1/(n − 1)! if
s ≤ 1, the last bound yields
In ≥
(∫ β
0
e−αyφk2(y) dy
)n(
logk1−1 n
(k1 − 1)!
)n ∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,e−1]n
s≤1
dx
≥ γn(log n)(k1−1)n
∫ e−1
0
sn−1
(n− 1)! ds = γ
n
1
(log n)(k1−1)n
n!
.
Therefore
(3.26) E[Sn,w] = n! In ≥ γn2 (log n)(k1−1)n.
Combining (3.25) and (3.26) we have proved
Theorem 3.10. If max(k1, k2) > 1 then
(log n)n
(
max(k2,k1)−1−o(1)
)
≤ E[Sn,w] ≤ (log n)(k1+k2−1+o(1))n,
i.e. E[Sn,w] grows super-exponentially fast.
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